Notes for an Anatomy of Modern Autobiography
Francis R. Hart FI OR whatever reasons, autobiography has become a flourishing and sophisticated art, and literary critic and theorist alike pay it increasing attention. The new sophistication of the artist has modified older expectancies and methods; and predictably, the new critical apologists divide into traditionalists, who seek to regularize what they take to be a "genre" with a hereditary essence -"true autobiography," Gusdorf's "autobiographie propre- Both sides are continually preoccupied with a question which, while inescapable, is in part a pseudo-problem: the relation in autobiographical writing of the fictive and the historical, "design" and "truth," Dichtung und Wahrheit. But two other questions also persist. The evaluative question of formal consistency and integrity provokes theorists to specific judgments that are conventional and premature. Moreover, analytic surveys of the question of autobiographical intention become rigid and exclusive, identifying "autobiography proper" with a single "form" or intention, and excluding works that differ in formal perspective, dramatic focus, or rhetorical end. The questions are neither improper nor irrelevant. But if their answers are not to be narrow or premature, they had best be considered first in light of the wide plurality of mimetic and formal value of which autobiography has proved capable. Following is a brief contribution to such an anatomy, focused on the three preoccupations I have singled out: the mimetic question of the interplay of history and fiction, the formal question of the tension between purposive form and experimental development, and the generic question of intention, of the autobiographer's fluctuating idea of his purpose and of the reader he would 1 Kazin, "Autobiography as Narrative," Michigan Quarterly Review, III (1964) On the first question, Rousseau sounds the keynot to his kind "a portrait in every way true to natur "in simple detail all that has happened to me, al all that I have felt," and, says Stephen Spender, "o does not tell the truth. There is a lie concealed method" (70). Truth is a definitive but elusive intention. John Morris is right: "autobiography history -a narrative of events occurring in tim the Bergsonian Gusdorf, "l'historien de soi-meme" "le pech6 original de l'autobiographie ... revenant propre passe, il postule l'unite et l'identite de son e confondre ce qu'il fut avec ce qu'il est devenu"
Renan was right, too, when he reflected on Goeth poesie for him), "Ce qu'on dit de soi est toujours p be history, autobiography must be fictive. The pag strating this truism might be better spent explorin Gusdorf and Kazin both contradict themselves on it. Gusdorf observes that in autobiography we are given "le temoignag homme sur lui mrme . . . la recherche de sa plus intime fid that the search itself is (like the mirror in a Dutch interior) a d sion of the life imaged; and then he pronounces surprisingly t matters little if the picture (the mirror!) is full of errors, omi lies: "fiction or imposture, the value of art is real"! Kazin o that Hemingway, Nabokov, Dahlberg, and others like them are autobiographers who simply use the appearance of fact to produce enjoyable narrative, "designed, even when the author does not say so, to make a fable of his life, to tell a story, to create a pattern of incident, to make a dramatic point." Yet, he acknowledges, the creative writer "turns to autobiography out of some creative longing that fiction has not satisfied," and finds there "some particular closeness and intensity of effect" that he values, some "felt relation to the life data themselves" (211-12). Autobiography, then, whatever the reader's response, must be a profoundly different activity. But perhaps the contradictions -or paradoxes -of Gusdorf and Kazin are truer than the categorical insistence of Shumaker that the autobiographer invariably "wishes to be understood as writing of himself and as setting down . . nothing that is not literally and factually true" (105), or the shifting rigidity of Mandel (220): "the autobiographer . . . may never falsify his facts for a fictional purpose without giving up his claim to the name of autobiographer"; he strives "to sound as truthful as possible"; he gives what he "wishes to be taken as true about his life." The truism that in autobiography history and fiction are intentionally distinct proves too slippery to hold.
Nevertheless, such theorists are on the right track. The autobiographer knows there are differences and struggles with them. Edwin Muir wistfully speaks of the freedom of fiction: "I could follow these images freely if I were writing an autobiographical novel. As it is, I have to stick to the facts and try to fit them in where they fit in."4 Spender wonders in retrospect "whether I would have done better to write my autobiography as a novel," without "the immediacy of the writer who says: 'the hero is I,' " and then replies to his own doubts.
He could not give "the truth about himself within the decent and conspiratorial convention of contemporary fiction"; that would be offering both reader and writer "avenues of escape from the glaring light of consciousness of him who says: 'I am I' " and would therefore defeat his confessional purpose.5 Nabokov, for whom the tracing of images into intricate harmonies is what autobiography does, nevertheless (like Goethe and other artist-autobiographers) deliberately writes to repossess the realities of his past from the sterile fictive world to which he has sacrificed them. "The man in me revolts against the fictionist" is both a theme and a motive of Speak, Memory6 (as of many autobiographies). The historicity of the recreation is impera-tive, even though the autobiographe that historicity. "I have changed Critics such as Gusdorf and Pascal recognize this. But the recognition has not yet had much effect on considerations of autobiographical form and intention. Neither can be thought of as having the autonomy or rhetorical accountability of form and intention in a purposive fiction; each may or may not reach a final state of articulation, for each must be experimental, dynamic. Yet even the best theoretic discussions of autobiography seem committed to forms that are "unified" and "appropriate" and rhetorical ends that are "achieved."
The most comprehensive survey of autobiographical "forms" is Shumaker's chapter on "Shape and Texture," filled with useful, if schematic, hypotheses, and yet chained to the deduction that form must be an achievement of unity, that the means of achievement is the selective principle appropriate to a certain autobiographical "kind," that the autobiographer must find or achieve his form, but that, alas, "autobiography is especially prone to impertinency" and we must be prepared "for the discovery of imperfections" (141) -surely a disconcerting way to look for what actually happens during an autobiographical "wrestling with" form. Shumaker's disciple Mandel forges himself the same critical situation. The critic must first seek an "organizing principle" or "purpose," ask "to what degree does [the work] reveal organic unity based on a defined sense of its own end?," expect "the conscious shaping of a whole life for one informing purpose," demand that the autobiographer as artist "be in control of the way in which he selects and presents" the "ambiguities of his nature" even though he "may not be able" to fathom them, and of course expect some autobiographers to create "dangerously protean" structures and many autobiographies, however impressive, to suffer from a lack of consistency and control (221-4). Such is the restrictiveness of a rhetorical approach to autobiographical form.
Pascal, in a sense the follower of Gusdorf, goes to an opposite pole and makes a prescriptive position out of a "process" view of form and an existentialist view of process. Where there is no voyage of genuine -hence unanticipated -self-discovery, we feel "a partial failure at any rate. Traditional terms will serve, so long as we understand them in their characteristic post-Enlightenment connotations. "Confession" is personal history that seeks to communicate or express the essential nature, the truth, of the self. "Apology" is personal history that seeks to demonstrate or realize the integrity of the self. "Memoir" is personal history that seeks to articulate or repossess the historicity of the self. "Confession" as an intention or impulse places the self relative to nature, reality; "apology" places the self relative to social and/or moral law; "memoir" places the self relative to time, history, cultural pattern and change. Confession is ontological; apology ethical; memoir historical or cultural. As these or any comparable definitions suggest, such intentions must overlap; one can hardly appear in total validity remains undemonstrated and controversial; they are offered simply as the kinds of observations I believe one needs to make and test before historical generalization and critical judgment are possible.
We begin with the question of truth, the first relation of which the autobiographical situation is made, the relation between the autobiographer and his personal, historical subject. The relation has various elements. To seek the personal focus of an autobiographical truth is to inquire what kind of "I" is selected, how far the selected "I" is an inductive invention and how far an intentional creation, and whether one single or one multiple "I" persists throughout the work. Moreover, the autobiographer's relation to the pastness or historicity of his selected "I" involves his sense and manipulation of the problem of continuity and discontinuity of identity and perspective. Again, perspective implies access, and the autobiographer's limited and erratic access to the past and present of that ambiguous "I" implies the problem of the form and authority of personal memory. In practice such selections of personal focus are numerous, fluctuating, and often mixed; and the interpreter has no business assuming that certain types and persistences of "I" are more "truly autobiographical" than others. I am not sure there is justification even for Mandel's reasonable postulate that "an autobiographer of great ability will select one aspect of his total personality to stand for the complex whole" (223). The selection of "I" is made and remade according to such criteria as naturalness, originality, essentiality, continuousness, integrity, and significance. By whatever criteria chosen, the selective "I" plays one or more of a number of structural roles: the "I" that has been hidden or misconstrued; the "I" that has been lost, or gained, regai sought after in vain; the "I" that has been cultivated, imposed, served, developed. The fate of the selective "I" is bound central concern, but the several elements of a multiple "I" m diverse fates, or a single fate may have various explanations, fate or fates may occasion various attitudes: comprehension or erment, celebration or lamentation.
Some autobiographers intend at first to delineate an "I" that is comprehensive, essential, total, while others intend initially only a partial personal truth, chronologically or analytically restricted. Such initial intentions may prove unstable or illusory, and the autobiographer's idea of what is total or essential -of the personal truth that matters -may not persuade or satisfy the reader. Moreover, the "total" autobiographer often discovers motives for restriction or refocusing that he had not anticipated. Rousseau would like "in some way to make my soul transparent to the reader's eye," to let the reader notice all of its movements (169), to recount faithfully the "succession of feelings" that constitute "the history of my soul" (262), and thus let the reader discover the "principle which has produced them." But that history becomes the lamentable record of how the perversities and contradictions of his nature have been exploited by a false and cruel society to prevent his becoming what nature intended him to be. The pervasive longing throughout his true history for the true self he could be only in rare intermittences of idyllic timelessness -with his cousin, with "Mama," with Therese -is, in a sense, the essential, if thwarted, Rousseau. Newman sets out in the Apologia'4 to show "what Dr. Newman means," to give "the true key to my whole life," to be "known as a living man," by showing historically how "the concrete being reasons; . . . the whole man moves" (136).
Many readers miss "the whole man" in the history of opinions, and are puzzled to find at crucial points -the illness in Sicily, for instance -that it is a divine mystery what Newman meant, that the meaning of Dr. Newman may in fact be comprehensible only when it has been sacrificed to the divine meaning -the principle of the Tracts: "we promote truth by a self-sacrifice." The essential or selective self of Ruskin's Praeterita is the youthful visionary, and the autobiographer imaginatively recovers identity with that lost self, but falls into confusion when trying to relate to and account for the fallen selves that replaced it after 1850. The selective "I" of Goethe's Dichtung und Wahrheit'5 might be equated with the "daemon" that drives him ohne hast ohne rast on to some mysterious destiny, or with the passion for experience, the c contributed to my own cul which I seized the world," th poetic power, the "tendency thing that delighted or tro 235), or most likely with tha tion of self-concentration a
The selves that undergo c Autobiography, and the A duplicity wherein a disinte somehow leaves a hidden or is somehow a transcendence of both. In their brave Rousseauistic candor, setting out to confess shy, unconventional selves, Gide a Spender (in If It Die and World Within World) 17 both struggle w the secrecy of their moral natures, their backgrounds in a puritan horror of intimacy. Both find it impossible to describe openly w really matters; both discover what Gide calls "the fear of being l on to say too much" (213); and both rest finally in the accept of their own intimate complexities, which prevail over any ultim articulation of a selective "I." The "spiritual and intellectual a biography" of Cleaver, Soul On Ice,18 begins in the sense of identity -a common starting point for the autobiographical situ -and moves on experimentally into several new identities -a uncommon direction for the situation to take. But which is the genuine Cleaver, the one who tells Beverley Axelrod he has sense of who he is, or the one who says this is false -he knows who he is -he is a vain deceiver and an egoistic prophet of d The "autobiography" of Edward Dahlberg, Because I Was Fle projects as strident a single rhetorical self as the most stride Cleaver's rhetorical selves. Yet Dahlberg's autobiographical voice in Boswellian bewilderment, how many contradictory and un selves can a man contain?
The autobiographer provokes a distinct expectation if he initially restricts the "I," analytically or developmentally. The autobiograph that breaks off with some climactic issue from youth or early appears to be a special problem of integrity and continuity. B restriction may prove less real than the totality. The autobiog whose selective "I" is a suprapersonal significance, a prin representativeness, sets out from a different kind of restric one equally problematic. "What interests me in any man Malraux,20 "is the human condition; in a great man, the fo essence of his greatness; in a saint, the character of his saint And in all of them, certain characteristics which express not s an individual personality as a particular relationship with the But Malraux has already asked, "what do I care about what only to me" (1)? And his answer is momentously personal never really learned to re-create myself . . . . I do not find very interesting" (2). Thus the selection of a personal represe ness may itself be definitive of an idiosyncratic "I." George K Memoirs21 cannot segregate the representative history of the American diplomat from Kennan's "intellectual autobiogra some would add, from his apology. Claude Brown proposes (in child in the Promised Land) to "talk about the first Northern generation of Negroes . . . about the experiences of a mi generation"22; and Gosse, Yeats, Henry Adams,23 and othe representative personal histories of cultural generations or conflicts, in which the selective "I" is a struggle with histori personal freedom and/or unity of being. Mill and Wells24 to give intellectual histories of what one calls an intellectual "rather below than above par" and the other calls "a very o brain." But the experimental Wells shifts focus: "Let me a pose and the lighting of my experiences so as to bring ou successive phases the emotional and sensual egoism rather intellectual egoism that has hitherto been the focus of at (349) . And Mill forms his record emphatically on the princip moral character is of far greater importance than intellectua Wordsworth and Goethe trace the growth of a poet's mind, r between conceptions of poet and of social or political man rem be worked out. The restrictive idea of a public career for Fra 2o Anti-Memoirs, trans. T. Kilmartin (New York, 1968 ), p. 8. 21 Memoirs (1925 -1950 (New York, 1969 Some autobiographers define the truth of the "I" in terms of such a tension. And it is tempting to single them out normatively as truer mature. Goethe's fluctuation between self-expansion and self-con tration is such a formative tension. For Rousseau such a tension sists between the serene and sociable "I" that should have been and the perverse and isolated "I" that nature and society have made. F the autobiographer of cultural conflict the tension may be of the T. E. Lawrence describes: "The effort for these years to live in dress of Arabs, and to imitate their mental foundation, quitted me my English self .... At the same time I could not sincerely tak the Arab skin .... I had dropped one form and not taken on other, and was become like Mohammed's coffin in our [?] lege with a resultant feeling of intense loneliness . . . . Sometimes the selves would converse in the void; and then madness was very ...."28 Stephen Spender postulates a tension of perspectival duplici "An autobiographer is really writing a story of two lives: his life it appears to himself, from his own position, when he looks ou the world from behind his eye-sockets; and his life as it appe from outside in the minds of others; a view which tends to become in part his own . . . . However, the great problem of autobiography remains, which is to create the true tension between these inner and outer, subjective and objective, worlds" (viii).
The tension between two lives is often formative in the autobiographical works we call journals. The act of journalizing intens the conflict in any autobiographer between life and pattern, mov ment and stasis, identification and definition, world and self. Jour izing becomes a habit of self-collective withdrawal -for the man action a time of retrospective stasis (Che in his jungle tree), for t social man a time of solitude (Boswell in the wee hours or conf by the clap), for the artist a moment of undisciplined expression. habit becomes a problem. Scott gave up journalizing because it ma him a solitary egoist. Otto Rank advised Anais Nin to "leave y Diary; that is withdrawing from the world," and Henry Miller to her it was her malady, her fear of transformation, her preoccupat with completeness.29 The tension becomes formative in Gide's jou nal.o3 For Amiel,31 too, on occasion, his journal "is a kind of epic ism rather than a discipline" (468); on others, it reestablishes integrity of the mind and the equilibrium of the conscience, tha one's inner health" (566). The journ is a kind of ontologic respiration, an itself punctuating and helping to sha lived. There may be a reason here wh biographers turn more to the journal The autobiographer has always had and whether to dramatize, the discontinuities inherent in autobiographical recreation. The most basic discontinuities are the intermittences of memory. Autobiographies are always what Morris calls "first of all exercises in recollection -recollection in its simplest conception, as the tactic the mind employs to mitigate the destructive powers of time" (62). But recollection in autobiography is never simple, always the process Berdyaev describes: "Such a cognitive process is not a mere remembering or recapitulation of the past: it is a creative act performed at the present moment."32 And the first question is whether to dramatize the act. Some do not. Others dramatize memory as a characterizing power, illustrating Malraux's dictum: "One day it will be realized that men are distinguishable as much by the forms their memories take as by their characters. The depths vary, as do the nets they use and the quarry they hunt" (102). It is hardly necessary to cite the complex retrospective mode of Wordsworth's Prelude, but equally distinctive are the forms of memory in other autobiographies.
Rousseau is as dependent as Wordsworth (or Proust) on the binoculars of retrospective vision. All that is left him now is memory; that other power his "fearful imagination" has done its worst. Yet the "sweet memories of my best years" are capricious, remind him of painful moments when he sought in vain to recapture remembered innocence, and lead him to chapters wherein sweet memory, like other powers of innocence, is transformed into bitterness and pain. The dominant memory of Nabokov's Speak, Memory is reminiscent of Rousseau's. But it is less an ambivalent gift of nature than an aristocratic inheritance, a well-cultivated estate. Nabokov reenters his past. It is his -an intensely personal possession which he jealously reclaims from fictional characters and worlds. Memory's "supreme achievement" is "the masterly use it makes of innate harmonies when gathering to its fold the suspended and wandering tonalities of the past" (70) . It creates -it must create -the most densely particularized harmonies, for "I have to make a rapid inventory of the universe .... I have to have all space and all time participate in my emotion, in my mortal love, so that the edge of its mortal-32 Dream and Reality: An Essay in Autobiography, trans. K. Lampert (New York, 1962). ity is taken off, thus helping me to fight the utter degradatio cule, and horror of having developed an infinity of sensa thought within a finite existence" (297).
Like Ruskin's and Gide's, Yeats's memory is informed by an sense of place: "I only seem to remember things dramatic in selves or that are somehow associated with unforgettable plac -places with human centers that exemplify proud, traditional tary ways of life. But the formative memory of Reveries is personal. It is fixed in local and family tradition, in legend, a anecdotal discontinuity of Reveries suggests the effect of leg tales. Identity is having one's story; leaving one's place is losin story. Creating a new personality is recreating one's legend in tion with memorable place. Gide finds in his temporal me The mother he has confessed to, commemorated, exorcised -the brave, fleshly lady barber portrayed by a fictive omniscience independent of the boy's present consciousness -even she, after all, is beyond memory and understanding. She has been vividly understood, but not by the phantom "I." It is as if the emergence of the "I" had displaced that understanding: "Who was Lizzie Dalberg? I wish to God I knew, but it is my infamy that I do not." Has the fictive narrator's compassionate omniscience redeemed the phantom boy-man from his infamy, or only deepened, articulated it?
Gosse is in an intriguingly similar imaginative paradox vis ia vis his remembered father. Like Nabokov -"The break in my own destiny affords me in retrospect a syncopal kick" (250) -Gosse initiates Father and Son in a radica proverb" that "the child is brief, "its impressions are so to record its history as it w before the wind. . . . But in with interminable hours, h the window pane. ... I feel feverish heat that was prod eye" (57) -Memory has rep mysterious continuity of s impression, setting its ow ceases to be solitary, it ceas tancing vividness wherein c reality. But, as in Dahlberg with an imaginative compas
We recall Sartre when Gosse remembers himself as "an adroit little pitcher," and think, too, of the extraordinary distance from whic Graves "remembers" the "caricature scenes that now seem to sum u the various stages of my life" (180) ,33 moments of absurd visualiz tion by which memory effectively bids "goodbye to all that" in th very act of comic revocation.
Such instances of memory's forms have taken us into consideratio of structure and method, problems of retrospective point of view a its essential paradox in autobiography. Effective access to a recollect self or its "versions" begins in a discontinuity of identity or being which permits past selves to be seen as distinct realities. Yet only continuity of identity or being makes the autobiographical act purpose meaningful. The paradox of continuity in discontinuity itself a problem to be experimented with, and it is a problem both o truth and of form. Manipulation of autobiographical point of view conditioned by the demands of the paradox, but it is also condition by rhetorical considerations of intention and emphasis, formal and stylistic considerations of clarity and proportion. And such deman necessarily fluctuate as the autobiographical situation evolves.
Consider two seemingly contradictory manipulations which togeth illustrate the paradox. Chapter One of Wright's Black Boy34 climax a recreation of the experience and awareness of a violent, lonely bo with a visit to the father who had deserted his family for a mistres
The scene closes. The narrator now superimposes Richard's ima 33 Graves, Good-bye to All That -the passage is only in the revised e (Garden City, 1957) . 34 Black Boy (New York, 1966) . "many times in the years after that" on the boy's sensory immedia Finally comes the long interpretive perspective of the man aft lapse of a quarter of a century "during which my mind and consc ousness had become so greatly and violently altered" that "I" th looked at the "sharecropper, clad in ragged overalls, holding a mud hoe in his gnarled, veined hands," with the compassion of a distan and mature understanding. The separation that had been the fathe moral recklessness had become a final condition of the autobiograp er's development. The development of the artist, the tragic natura whose emergence we trace in the next chapter, is the precondit of the imaginative truth achieved by an intricate conflation of te oral and psychological perspectives. Of such intermingled disc tinuities is an autobiographical truth formed.
Or The truth of a particular autobiography demands its own discrimination and conflation of perspectives, and hence its own narrativ mode. Even the diurnal unit of the journalist, from Boswell to Ch Guevara, is an artifice of multiple perspectives -levels of retrospect minglings of dramatic and real anticipation, operations of significant selection. Wordsworth and Rousseau, Gosse and Adams and Nabokov, all seem basically to share th associate with Thackeray and are mimetically, as well as f Gosse would be unsuitable for tion with the potencies and fr a dialogic-scenic mode. Rousse to a totality of perspective: R view, and Newman must be each historic moment. The co other temporal, however, an walk to Vincennes demands a tion of the illness in Sicily or tung und Wahrheit necessar Goethe's idea of a cumulative prehensive than Wordsworth and assimilation, not the suc The Prelude. Perhaps the mos ical narratives is in the pan reason, since the Education is continuity, whose rational evo that his vision of order in hi rule is ludicrous catastrophism The inference is clear. The in had best interpret its method And the same is true of structure. The nature of an extended autobiographical act makes it self-defeating for the interpreter to exp some predictable integrity or unity. Form is too experimental, "accidental," and at the same time too inherent in perspectives stil to be recovered or imposed by memory. Conflicts or fluctuations perspective and intention may themselves become formative, and t personal history that emerges may reveal variant or conflicting as sumptions about meaningful orders in life. Furthermore, form really a multiplicity of formative options in the simplest autobiog raphy: options of selection and exclusion, interpretive refocus rearrangement, conflations of historical and expository arrangemen developmental rhythms in narrative and situational rhythms in th autobiographer's sense of movement toward his end.
To begin with, autobiographers set out with divergent views of th appropriateness of form. Gauguin insists his journal intime is " a book," and Cocteau confesses in his "journal" that formlessne may itself be an imposition: "Has the book I am writing comple its curve? I who boast, and in its very chapters, of never being pr occupied with it . . . . Can I still speak to you, and keep this journa which is not really one, in the form of a journal, based happens to me? That would be falsifying its mechanism."3 constantly preoccupied with form in If It Die, troubled spatial form memory imposes. He intermittently resists and su to and justifies it, yet insists that "this is not a literary com I am just writing down my recollections as they come to m Boswell's passion for form leads to such finely formed continu the London Journal36 as "the Louisa saga." He recognizes in h a "love of form for its own sake" (128), and his repeated frus in trying to live by a form simply lead to marvelous rational of formal variations. The journal was "to contain a consistent of a young fellow eagerly pushing through life," but salutary bling divagations remind him "the hero of a romance or nove not go uniformly along in bliss .... Aeneas met with many dis in his voyage to Italy, and must not Boswell have his rub The London Journal may thus have "more form" than th proaches to the past made at distinct times in differing m that Yeats finally titled Autobiography. The formal passion of operates to form his autobiography, yet he evidently found f problematic that he left six finely formed, differently focu overlapping fragments. Henry Adams's "idol Gibbon" is reinc in the autobiographer of the Education, who says, "From c grave this problem of running order through chaos, direction space, discipline through freedom, unity through multipli always been, and must always be, the task of education" ( rich coherences, the elegant if whimsical patterning and focu Adams's world attest to the control of the philosophical histo relentless search of "the working of law in history" (363), dete that "everything must be made to move together" (378), w "hero" learns by successive false starts that Mont Blanc lik spectacles of being is "a chaos of anarchic and purposeless (289). The result is a curious mock-form, a study in the lu but beautiful balancing of illusion, a protagonist who co the solemn naivete of Rasselas (378) is not the same as Franklin and such shifts, however "accidental," must be formative. Mill's final chapter is punctuated by "In resuming my pen some years after closing the preceding narrative" (170). A silent majority of autobiographers must have found themselves in the midway metamorphosis best described by Edwin Muir: "I finished the first part of this book thirteen years ago. ... The generation to which I belong has survived an age, and the part of our life which is still immobilized there is like a sentence broken off before it could be completed; the future in which it would have written its last word was snatched away and a raw new present abruptly substituted; and that present is reluctant now to formulate its own sentence" (194) . Form in autobiography is too contingent on shifting situations ever to be interpreted as if it might be a static integrity. It is contingent as well on shifting principles of selectivity, any one of which may be revised or replaced as each new stage of self-recreation forces a reappraisal of what is relevant. A static interpretation of selectivity would cite the "spots of time" passage in Prelude XII and suppose that events throughout have been selected accordingly. Yet the passage with its two long associative "memorials" occurs in the framing of the crucial moment of restoration; the moment becomes continuous with the autobiographical present and thus reveals a final vision of restorative events. Events in earlier books illustrate earlier visions of events: those testifying to the ministry of beauty and fear, to the reality of vocation or consecration, those that exemplify the imagination's characteristic powers and aspirations, and man's nobility and pathos. Different principles operate at different stages. The shape of the recovered event is the shape of recovery at that point, the shape of the event as then recovered. As Black Boy traces the shaping of a literary artist, we see the growth of a vision of human events, and that vision as a selective principle necessarily evolves. At the beginning, Yeats views events as legendary, timeless, antithetical to the action of "inorganic logical straightness." Later as he "must not only describe events but those patterns into which they fall, when I am the looker-on" (221) The question of the end in autobiographical form is a co Narrative recreation and autobiographical situation someh nate at once in a resolution of both narrative pattern and for such pattern. Any "end" belongs to both. Goethe's Dic Nabokov's Speak, Memory both delight in the ever-expand ture of past worlds. For Goethe, as Pascal observes, the fo irregularly moving expansion," an "ever-widening arc," wi of return, because for Goethe the self is a steady assimilat sion. But there is a counter-rhythm -or rather counte Goethe's lifelong tendency to use his imagination to put h rest, to see how it stands relative to the moving world, t to fix that which is confused or unstable in himself (as h with Werther). His love of theatre, of ritual, of festive ce disguise and sacrament, is the love of one who finds "com regular recurrence of external things" (II, 159). Nabok the process of repossessing a past world as an achievemen through form -hence, "a colored spiral in a small ball of is how I see my own life" (275). But the stasis can only Robert Frost called "a momentary stay against confusion. biographical form can seem closed if, like Adams, the aut adopts the final fiction of seeing his whole life as pa Newman and Mill, of seeing all significant movement com the form may "close" with the cessation of all narrative m a climax of the autobiographical act. Sartre's lifelong f unreal selves and spurious idealisms comes to rest in a fin tion of self-will in the autobiographer. Podhoretz narrates to try a personal book about the problem of "success," itse bid for success, and announces, "I just have," throwing all tive abruptly into the resolution of a dramatic present. Th of Soul On Ice, a progression of distinct modes like Yeats' raphy, move from the autobiographical loss of an old mythical affirmation of a new, from colloquial reminiscen portrait, through cultural prophecy, through the intimate of the letters to Beverley Axelrod, to mythopoeic visio sexual Jerusalem. The Prelude, too, ends in mythopoe vision is reached by way of an ambiguous journey backward forwards, into "fallings away" natural and artificial, and final re tion of a possibly waning power without whose sustaining force journey could not have been taken. The movement of Spen World Within World is comparably complex: a historico-cul journey through a decade of crisis; a Conradian movement towa dark center of an imperative personal complexity; a quest fo "wheels within wheels," the repossessed childhood that at last aff and encompasses the integrity of the adult. No one has unde better than Spender the complexities of autobiographical for its relation to the confessional intention.
So we turn at last to the question of intention, the shifting ground of the autobiographer's form, the condition of the truth he struggles for, itself subject to dramatic and narrative redefinition as the personal center fluctuates and formal options are seized or rejected.
Having recognized four "kinds" of autobiography -diary or journal, confession, reminiscence, and personal history, Berdyaev declares that Dream and Reality will be none of these: "I decided to make this study of myself not only because I feel the need of expressing and communicating myself (a reason for which I cannot possibly claim the attention of the reader), but also because this may help to raise and resolve certain problems concerning man and his destiny and contribute to the understanding of our age. I also feel the necessity of explaining the apparent inconsistencies and contradictions which have been ascribed to my philosophical outlook .... I should like memory to overcome oblivion in regard to all that is of value in it" (x-xi) Thus, having disowned all antecedents, Berdyaev embraces all three traditional autobiographical intentions: to communicate one's self (confession) ; to show the integrity of one's career (apology); to repossess one's past (memoir) ! Ostensibly at an opposite pole is the Gibbonian autobiographer, who professes that "my own amusement is my motive, and will be my reward" (27) . But such professions probably confirm Sartre's view that "our deeper intentions are plans and evasions which are inseparably linked" (120).
The list is long of autobiographers who commence, like Rousseau, by insisting that what they seek to do is not quite what the reader expects: "It is, I suppose, a hybrid form."39 Also long is the list of those who periodically discriminate in their motives, reassert control over the reader's generic expectations, and in so doing refine or redefine their intentions: "this is not history but education"; rather, this is the "long mistake" of a "search for education," "the shifting search for the education he never found," rather "adventures in search of education" (Adams, 172, 185, 162) . Each new formal resolution calls for a new justification, hence revelation, of intention; "but I do not judge," repeats the confessor; "I simply relate" -and his protestations accumulate with the force of a devious judicial act. Something inherent in autobiographical process calls for the continuous refocusing of expectation and intention, as each autobiographer discovers his own fluctuating mixture of confession, apology, and memoir.
Rousseau insists on "confession" as his intention, repeatedly disclaims apology, yet Pascal rightly argues that the work is apology. "Confession" is the primary motive of Rousseau's history that gives integrity to his entire social life. The work is the confessor's characteristic act of friendship, an apology for the confessor, intended to achieve at last the society his life has consistently failed to achieve. The interplay of confession and apology is definitive; so precarious and intermittent is his repossession of a historic world that "memoir" is almost irrelevant. Gide resembles Rousseau in his determination to reveal the "secret" of his life as an "act of penance," but there is little apologetic impulse, and there is, intermittently, much of the commemorative passion of the memoirist in distinctive interaction with the confessional intention. Podhoretz resembles Rousseau, too, in confessing his public life around the "dirty little secret" of the desire for success; but memoiristic apology is strong. Like Rousseau, Goethe finds a confessional integrity in a prevalent tendency of his life: "All, therefore, that has been confessed by me, consists of fragments of a great confession; and this little book is an attempt which I have ventured on to render it complete" (I, 235). But this is confession to himself (or his daemon) of his creative relations with the natural and historic world, confession that achieves its end through memoir, the repossession of a rich and expansive experience. Spender's World Within World is a mixture of Rousseau and Goethe. But the apologetic intention evolves toward a confessional act of climact political meaning. The book is as much concerned as Rousseau's with the precariousness of friendship, but the kind of relationship it chief defines is one we associate with memoir -personal integrity in a wor of history, and what is confessed is a defiant personal balance individuality and community.
Paradoxically, Newman the "apologist" writes in a situation closer to Rousseau's than the situations of Goethe, Spender, and Gide t "confessors." His initial intention seems closer too: he will repla the phantom deceiver in men's imagination with his truth. But jus as his assumptions about personality and history differ, so his confe sional-apologetic intention must evolve differently too. What is co letter to his wife, and perhaps are complicated in interplay. able education"; he will show pressing forward, achieving in weighs more with me than eith edgment of the debts which m owes to other persons" (1) (Mandel, 222 ). It will not do to insist that this "chief attention" must slight the representativeness of the author as witness. It will not do to object that "autobiography proper" gives the wholeness of a life; many autobiographers do not do so, and anyway, an autobiographer may choose to reveal or collect the "wholeness" of his life around one central or cataclysmic event or influence or relationship. Nor can we say that one who is the observer of, rather than a major participant in, his personal history writes memoir rather than autobiography. Adams's autobiography is the history of an (unwilling) observer, and Lawrence of Arabia, whose Seven Pillars of Wisdom is allegedly not "true autobiography," could not write a personal history of a significant segment of his life except as a confessional or apologetic participant. Had Orwell written a "true autobiography," it would undoubtedly have been less "autobiographical" than a "memoir" by Spender or Newman or Mailer. What Malraux calls Anti-Memoirs is more "memoir" than "autobiography" for autobiographical reasons, as we have seen. George Kennan entitles Memoirs a book which he
